USA v. Roman Surratt by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-29-2011 
USA v. Roman Surratt 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Roman Surratt" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 153. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/153 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL  
 
UNITED STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-2303 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ROMAN SURRATT, 
                           Appellant 
__________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2:08-cr-00376-026) 
District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose 
__________________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 28, 2011 
 
Before: FISHER, VANASKIE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: November 29, 2011) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.   
 
 On October 28, 2008, a grand jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania 
indicted Roman Surratt for violating 21 U.S.C. § 846 for conspiring and possessing with 
intent to distribute five kilograms or more of a mixture containing a detectable amount of 
cocaine and fifty or more grams of a mixture and substance containing a detectable 
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amount of cocaine base, also known as crack cocaine or crack.  The grand jury also 
indicted Surratt for violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) for possessing with 
intent to distribute a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of heroin. 
On June 18, 2009, Surratt pleaded guilty to the cocaine base and heroin offenses, 
accepting responsibility for possessing 149 grams of crack and 22.9 grams of heroin.  
During his plea hearing, the District Court advised Surratt that his crack cocaine offense 
was subject to a 120-month mandatory minimum sentence.  The District Court then 
ordered a Presentence Investigative Report (PSR).  The PSR used the 2008 edition of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, effective November 1, 2008.  Surratt’s 
initial advisory guideline calculation was 108 to 135 months based upon a total offense 
level of 31 and a criminal history category of I.  Surratt did not object to this calculation.  
Because the applicable statute of conviction, 21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(A)(iii), required a ten-
year (120-month) mandatory minimum sentence, the advisory guideline range became 
120 to 135 months pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(c)(2).  On September 11, 2009, the 
District Court sentenced Surratt to 120 months’ imprisonment, the statutory mandatory 
minimum and bottom of the guideline range. 
On April 2, 2010, Surratt filed a pro se motion to reduce his sentence under 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c), arguing that the District Court incorrectly calculated his guideline 
range by using an 80-to-1 crack-to-powder cocaine quantity ratio to determine his base 
offense level.  The District Court denied Surratt’s motion, holding that his sentence was 
correctly imposed pursuant to the statutory minimum term of imprisonment required by 
21 U.S.C. § 841.  Surratt then filed this appeal pro se, arguing that the District Court 
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should have exercised its discretion and used a reduced drug quantity ratio to impose a 
lighter sentence. 
I.  
 We have jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We reject Surratt’s sentencing challenge and will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
 The District Court was obligated to impose a sentence of at least 120 months 
based on Surratt’s offense, which was subject to a 120-month mandatory minimum under 
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).  A district court may grant a motion to reduce a 
defendant’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) only when “a defendant . . . has been 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently 
been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  A defendant is 
not eligible for a reduction under § 3582(c)(2) if another statute or provision, such as a 
statutory mandatory minimum, controls the defendant’s sentence.  See United States v. 
Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2009).   
 The District Court did not have discretion to impose a lower sentence because, 
“unlike the advisory sentencing guidelines range, ‘the statutory minimum drug trafficking 
penalty in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) . . . is mandatory.’”  United States v. Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 
113 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir. 2006)).  
Moreover, any potential change to Surratt’s advisory guideline range resulting from the 
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”) does not alter our decision because the Act’s 
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changes to mandatory minimum crack penalties do not apply retroactively.1
II. 
  See Reevey, 
631 F.3d at 114-15.  Therefore, the statutorily required minimum term of imprisonment 
remains 120 months.  Because the offense carried a 120-month mandatory minimum 
sentence and his guideline range did not change, Surratt is not entitled to a sentencing 
reduction under § 3582(c). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                                          
 1 On June 30, 2011, the Sentencing Commission unanimously voted to apply the 
new Guidelines retroactively to defendants sentenced before the FSA’s passage.  That 
decision, however, does not affect the statutory mandatory minimums and has no bearing 
on the resolution of the issue before us.  See United States v. Dixon, 648 F.3d 195, 198 
n.1 (3d Cir. 2011).  In United States v. Reevey, we held that the Savings Statute found at 
1 U.S.C. § 109 precluded a defendant from receiving the benefit of the FSA’s statutory 
changes if both the offense and initial sentencing occurred before the FSA’s enactment.  
Reevey, 631 F.3d at 114-15.  Surratt is precluded from the benefit of the FSA’s statutory 
changes for precisely the same reason.  Surratt’s appeal is not governed by Dixon, where 
we applied the FSA’s statutory changes to the defendant who committed the offense 
before the enactment of the FSA, but was sentenced after the FSA’s enactment.  Dixon, 
648 F.3d at 203.  
